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ABSTRACT
Drug injury advertising, which solicits consumers for lawsuits against drug
and medical device manufacturers, is a $114 million business. Yet little is known
about how consumers respond to the medical information contained in these ads.
This study applies insights from the field of marketing to the drug injury
advertising context, and further tests those insights through two experiments.
Results suggest that some consumers are deceived by drug injury ads, and that
some types of advertising are more deceptive than others. We also find that
deceptive drug injury ads have a stronger influence on consumer risk perceptions
and behavioral intentions, such as intentions to use the medication or seek
additional information. These effects can be mitigated somewhat through
educational interventions or competing ads that promote the drug. Additionally,
we find some evidence of a "spillover effect," where groups unaffected by the risks
described in the ad nevertheless perceive increased risk. We situate the study
within the factual and legal background for drug injury advertising, as well as the
extant scientific literature. We conclude with a discussion of the regulatory
implications of the study.
* Jesse King, PhD, Assistant Professor of Marketing, Goddard School of Business and Economics,
Weber State University. Elizabeth Tippett, J.D. Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of
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of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, and
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INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2017, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held an
oversight hearing on attorney ethics relating to drug injury advertising.' The term
"drug injury advertising" refers to attorney advertisements soliciting viewers for
potential lawsuits against drug companies and medical device makers.2 The
advertisers hope to recruit consumers that have suffered a particular adverse
medical event after taking a prescription drug or using a medical device.3 To
capture viewers' attention, these advertisements sometimes include strong
cautionary language about the dangers of a particular drug, through words like
"medical alert" or "FDA Warning.",4
Drug injury advertisements disseminate drug safety information to
consumers, which may help inform consumer decision making.5 At the same time,
if they lead consumers to overestimate drug risks, the ads could distort consumer
medical decisions.6 The hearing included testimony from two doctors, who
described cajoling patients frightened by drug injury ads to stick to their prescribed
drug regimen.7 Each reported that a patient had died after discontinuing medication
in response to a drug injury ad. 8 The hearing also included testimony from a legal
ethics attorney, who complained about the picayune nature of existing attorney
ethics rules for advertising and cautioned lawmakers against further regulation. 9
One of the authors of this article (Tippett), also testified at the hearing,
1. Examining Ethical Responsibilities Regarding Attorney Advertising: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution and CivilJustice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (June
23, 2017) [hereinafter Subcomm. Hearing], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
115hhrg29776/html/CHRG-I 15hhrg29776.htm.
2. Elizabeth Tippett, Medical Advice from Lawyers: A Content Analysis of Advertising for
Drug Injury Lawsuits, 41 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 8 (2015).
3. These adverse medical events are also known as "adverse drug reactions." WORLD HEALTH
ORG., INTERNATIONAL DRUG MONITORING: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CENTERS, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
TECH REP. NO. 498 (1972).
4. Tippett, supra note 2, at 26-28; see also Daniel Schaffzin, Warning: Lawyer Advertising
May Be Hazardous to Your Health! A Call to Fairly Balance Solicitation of Clients in
Pharmaceutical Litigation, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 319, 321-322 (2013).
5. Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Elizabeth Tippett).
6. Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Elizabeth Tippett, Dr. Shawn Fleming,
Dr. Ilana Kutinsky).
7. See Subcomm. Hearing (testimony of Dr. Shawn Fleming); Subcomm. Hearing (testimony
of Dr. Ilana Kutinsky).
8. Fleming, supra note 7; Kutinsky, supra note 7.
9. Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Lynda Shely). See also ASS'N OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, 2015 REPORT OF THE REGULATION OF LAWYER
ADVERTISING COMMITTEE (2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professionalresponsibility/aprljune
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providing context about the drug injury advertising market, its regulation, and the
limited scientific research to date. This Article draws upon and further elaborates
upon that testimony. It also adds to the scientific literature through two
experimental studies on how consumers respond to drug injury advertising. The
study is modeled on theory and research from the marketing field, but designed to
answer several legally relevant questions: (1) Are viewers misled by drug injury
advertisements? (2) Are some drug injury advertisements more misleading than
others? (3) Do drug injury advertisements influence consumer risk perceptions and
behavioral intentions? (4) Can educational interventions reduce the extent to which
viewers are misled by drug injury advertisements? and (5) Does competing content
from other sources mitigate the influence of drug injury advertising?
Overall, results suggest that consumers are sometimes deceived by drug injury
advertising. While consumers were almost always able to identify the sponsor of
an ad for soap or a direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical ad (97%), some viewers
were confused about the sponsor of the drug injury advertisement, ranging from
16% of participants (for a transparent ad) to 28% (for a deceptive ad). As we
explain below, this failure may substantially impair their ability to contextualize
the medical information in the advertisement.
In addition, the most deceptive advertisements had a greater influence on
viewers' risk perceptions and behavioral intentions, suggesting that the
questionable content ultimately influences how viewers feel and potentially even
behave with respect to the drug. We also observed a so-called "spillover" effect -
where perceptions of increased risk affected viewers outside the population
affected by the risk. The presence of a spillover effect suggests that attorney ads
could be distorting patient risk perception.
The results also offer some guidance for how to mitigate the effect of drug
injury advertisements on risk perceptions. The presence of a competing
pharmaceutical ad in some respects cancelled out the effect of the drug injury ad.
Pharmaceutical companies thus may have the means to counteract some effects of
drug injury ads, albeit at considerable expense. Educational interventions also
reduced confusion about the sponsor of the ad, and the effect of this confusion on
risk perceptions and behavioral intentions. This suggests that a disclaimer-based
approach might help, although further research is warranted as to the size,
prominence, sequence, and content of disclaimers.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the market for drug injury
advertising and how it is regulated. Part II summarizes extant scientific literature
on drug injury advertising, and Part III applies research from the field of marketing
to help theorize how consumers respond to the ads. Part IV describes the
methodology for the studies and Part V summarizes the results. Part VI discusses
the regulatory implications.
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I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Market for Drug Injury Advertising
Drug injury advertisements recruit viewers for mass tort lawsuits against
pharmaceutical companies and medical device manufacturers. These lawsuits are
typically pled as "failure to warn" cases, alleging that the manufacturer knew or
should have known about a particular risk associated with the drug and disclosed
that risk on the drug's label. 10
Drug injury advertisers (and lawyers) learn about undisclosed drug risks from
a number of sources. When a patient suffers an adverse medical event after taking
a drug, that event may be reported to the Food and Drug Administration for
inclusion in an adverse event database." Researchers draw from that data, or other
medical records, in their studies on adverse events. 12 Legal advertisers apparently
monitor scientific publications regarding adverse events and then sponsor
advertising asking viewers if they have suffered the adverse event described in the
literature. 13 Legal advertisers may also sponsor advertising following action by the
FDA 14 - for example, where the FDA demands that a pharmaceutical company
add additional warnings to the drug label. I" When new adverse events come to
light, it is very rare for the drug to be recalled from the market entirely.16 As a
result, almost all drug injury ads involve drugs or medical devices that are still
10. STEVEN GARBER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PRODUCT
LIABILITY AND OTHER LITIGATION INVOLVING THE SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
PHARMACEUTICALS 19 (2013). For cases deciding on failure to warn, see Pliva v. Mensing, 131 S.
Ct. 2567, 2573-74, 2577 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
11. Brian Chen, John Restaino & Elizabeth Tippett, Key Elements in Adverse Drug Reactions
Safety Signals: Application of Legal Strategies, CANCER POLICY: PHARMACEUTICAL SAFETY 47 (June
McKoy, Dennis West eds. (2019) (describing the adverse event reporting system). Because adverse
event reporting is voluntary, the majority of adverse events are not reported to the FDA. See e.g.
Mara McAdams, Judy Staffa, & Gerald Dal Pan, Estimating the extent of reporting to FDA: a case
study of statin-associated rhabdomyolysis, 17 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY AND DRUG SAFETY 229
(2008).
12. Id. at 4.
13. David N. Juurlink et al., The Effect of Publication on Internet-Based Solicitation of
Personal-Injury Litigants, 177 CAN. MED. Assoc. J. 1369, 1370 (2007).
14. See Brian K. Chen & Elizabeth C. Tippett, Association of Attorney Advertising and FDA
Action with Prescription Claims: A Time Series Segmented Regression Analysis, 38 DRUG SAFETY
1169, 1172 (2015).
15. Brian K. Chen & Y. Tony Yang, Post-Marketing Surveillance of Prescription Drug Safety:
Past, Present & Future, 34 J. LEGAL MED., 193, 204-05 (2013).
16. LEWIS GROSSMAN, PETER BARTON HuTT & RICHARD MERRILL, FOOD & DRUG LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1303-04 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining that most recalls are "voluntary" in the sense that
the manufacturer will recall the drug at the FDA's request); Michael T. Roberts, Mandatory Recall
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available on the market,17 and that could influence the medical decisions of some
viewers.
Drug injury advertisements tend to conform to a genre, although they can vary
somewhat in the way their content is framed. One of our prior studies examined
the content of attorney advertising broadcast in 2009. Overall, the ads tended to
focus heavily on the adverse medical event associated with the drug at issue. 18 Ads
devoted far more time, and content, to discussing adverse events, with a median of
20 seconds devoted to adverse events, compared to 2 seconds for benefits/use of
the drug.' 9 While all of the ads included in the study discussed adverse events
associated with the drug, only about half mentioned the benefit or use of the drug.
20
Only 39% of ads advised viewers to consult a doctor, which was often displayed
in small print on the screen.21 Most of the ads tended to reveal themselves as
attorney advertising within the first few seconds.22 However, a subset of the
advertisements in the study-about 20 0/--appeared to mimic public service
announcements, containing cautionary language such as "FDA warning"
"consumer alert" or "medical alert.",2 3 This subset of ads also tended to delay their
disclosure that the ad was sponsored by an attorney.24 In a few of the ads, the
attorney sponsor of the ad was not disclosed at all. 25
The genre of drug injury advertising has not changed significantly since the
original content analysis. For example, one advertisement involving the anti-
coagulant, Xarelto included the following language:
26
Have you taken the blood thinner Xarelto? If so, please listen
carefully. Xarelto, a new blood thinner on the market since 2011
has caused incidents of uncontrollable bleeding, hemorrhaging,
and even death. The makers of Xarelto sold the drug knowing that
it had no antidote to reverse its blood thinning effects. If you've
suffered hemorrhaging, gastrointestinal bleeding, stroke or if a
loved one has died after taking Xarelto, call 1-888-294-9999 now
to see if your case qualifies for substantial cash compensation.
Likewise, the use of cautionary language and medical imagery remains
17. Tippett, Medical Advicefrom Lawyers, supra note 2, at 7.
18. Id. at 21.
19. Id. at 21.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 20.
22. Id. at 29.
23. Id. at 26.
24. Id. at 28.
25. Id. at 30.
26. Subcomm. Hearing (testimony of Elizabeth Tippett), supra note 1. The content is from a
dataset obtained from Kantar media for advertising broadcast between 2015-2016.
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common, although some ads do so without obscuring the identity of the advertiser.
Figures 1-3, below, represent screenshots of advertising broadcast in 2015-2016
and illustrate the diversity of ways that advertisers use fear-based appeals,
references to medical and government authorities, and stark imagery to capture
viewer attention.
Figure 127
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Figure 3 29
Unlike class action claims, 30 plaintiffs in a mass tort claim are not jointly
represented by a single law firm. Instead, mass tort claims aggregate individual
lawsuits, where each plaintiff has their own lawyer. 31 Thus, a mass tort claim
involving hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs may also involve scores of lawyers.32
Successful mass tort claims can be valuable for the attorneys involved because
they are typically compensated on a contingency fee. 33 This financial incentive has
produced a market in which advertisers compete to identify the most valuable
plaintiffs for promising (or well-established) mass tort claims. Over the course of
a year, about 53,000 drug injury advertisements are broadcast on national cable
and broadcast networks. 34 This figure, which does not include local broadcast
figures, amounts to about 145 ads per day. Kantar Media estimates the aggregate
cost of those ads at around $114 million. 35
29. Id.
30. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g).
31. See Paul D. Rheingold, How Leadership Arises in MTL; Litigation Groups, LITIGATING
MASS TORT CASES § 7:5 (2017); see also Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding
Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 965 (1993);
Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District
Litigation: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 115 (2010).
32. Rheingold, supra note 31, at § 7:5 ("Rare is the mass case in which there is only one law
firm representing all plaintiffs. In some mass litigations, there may be thousands of law firms .... ).
33. Task Force on Contingent Fees of the A.B.A.'s Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section,
Contingent Fees in Mass Tort Litigation, TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 108 [hereinafter Task Force
on Contingent Fees].
34. Subcomm. Hearing (testimony of Elizabeth Tippett), supra note 1.
35. Id.
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Table 1. Most Prolific National Advertisers, 2015/201636
Number of Percentage of
advertising national
spots aired advertising volume
1. PULASKI LAW FIRM 11,491 21%
2. GOLDWATER LAW FIRM 10,298 19%
3. GOLD SHIELD GROUP 5,538 10%
4. KNIGHTLINE LEGAL 3,636 7%
5. FERRER, POIROT & WANSBROUGH 1,974 4%
6. AKIN MEARS LAW FIRM 1,828 3%
7. DRISCOLL FIRM 1,119 2%
8. GOZA & HONNOLD ATTORNEYS 1,049 2%
9. AVRAM BLAIR & ASSOCIATES 955 2%
10. RELION GROUP 948 2%
The advertising market is quite concentrated, with the top three advertisers
representing about 50% of the overall advertising volume (Table 1). The top ten
advertisers account for 72% of all advertising volume.37 The top advertisers are
not limited to law firms. In particular, the number 3 advertiser (Gold Shield
Group), the number 4 advertiser (Knightline Legal), and the number 10 advertiser
(Relion Group) are private companies. The Gold Shield Group is a trademark
owned by MCM Services Group LLC,38 a "lead management" company providing
advertising services for lawyers. 39 Based on its marketing materials, it appears to
produce advertising content and provide ad buying services for individual law
firms.4 0 Knlightline Legal is a trademark owned by a California LLC.4 ' Its website
claims that it is "not a law firm or referral service and does not provide legal
representation to visitors of this site."4 2 Relion Group is a Delaware Corporation
with headquarters in California. Its disclaimer provides that it "is a consolidated
36. Id. (Tippett testimony).
37. Id.
38. Id. (Tippett testimony, citing GOLD SHIELD GRP. trademark Registration No. 4684241).
39. Id. (Tippett testimony, citing MCM SERVS. GRP., http://mcmservicesgroup.com/).
40. Id. (Tippett testimony, citing GOLD SHIELD GRP.,
http://www.herniameshalert.com/disclaimer/; Notice, Disclaimers, and Terms of Use, ICANN,
https://whois.icann.org/en/lookup?name=www.herniameshalert.com; Celebrating Fifteen Years of
First-Class Law Firm Advertising, MCM SERVS. GRP., http://mcmservicesgroup.com/law-firm-
advertising-portfolio/).
41. Id. (Tippett testimony, citing KNIGHTLINE LEGAL, Registration No. 4643581).
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group of participatory attorneys ....
The remaining top advertisers appear to be law firms. However, some of these
top advertisers do not appear to litigate many cases that result from their
advertising. For example, a search for the firm name in Bloomberg dockets
produced few results for the Pulaski Law Firm, Goldwater Law Firm, and the
Driscoll Firm. Others 44 in the top ten litigated with greater frequency - for
example, Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough appeared in 331 cases in a 5-year period,
and Goza & Honnold in 710 cases. Conversely, some of the less prolific advertisers
were heavy litigators. For example, the Levin Papantonio Thomas Mitchell
Rafferty & Proctor firm sponsored fewer than 300 advertising spots but appeared
in more than 2,500 cases since 2012. The firm, Freese and Goss, sponsored only 7
advertising spots, but appeared in more than 1,900 cases.
The disconnect between litigation filings and advertising-as well as the
presence of non-law firm advertisers-suggests that some law firms, and
corporations, specialize in producing and financing advertising spots, while other
law firms specialize in litigating.45 This market will thus require some form of
transaction between the advertiser that generated the lead and the litigator that files
the claim. The nature of these transactions are not widely known, as they exist in
an ambiguous regulatory space within attorney ethics rules.4 6 Generally, the
players appear to avoid ethics scrutiny by treating both the advertising firm and the
litigating firm as jointly responsible for the case, in exchange for paying the
advertising firm a percentage of the fee eventually recovered in the case.47 These
complex transactions are not apparent from the content of the ad, which, as
discussed in greater detail below, may hinder consumers' ability to infer the
pecuniary motives of the advertiser and contextualize the medical information in
the advertising.
B. Legal Rules
Attorney advertising is currently regulated at the state level, through attorney
ethics rules. While state attorney ethics rules vary, all states regulate attorney
43. Id. (Tippett testimony, citing Disclaimer, RELION GROUP,
http://www.reliongroup.com/disclaimer; Del. Dep't of St., Div. of Corps., File No. 5378204, Relion
Medial Group, Inc., incorporated Aug. 5, 2013; RELION MEDIA GROUP, Registration No. 3970426
(listed at same address)).
44. Dataset (on file with author).
45. See Tippett, supra note 2, at 8-9 (noting a similar disconnect between advertising volume
and litigation frequency in a 2009 sample).
46. See discussion infra Part VI.
47. Task Force on Contingent Fees, supra note 33, at 108 (advertisers "will refer their cases in
bulk to other lawyers who specialize in handling mass tort claims. The original [advertising] lawyers
will make the referrals in return for a percentage of the new lawyer's percentage and perhaps some
reimbursement of costs.").
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advertising in some way. All states include some form of prohibition on false or
misleading advertising.4 8 Some states also impose specific requirements on
advertisers, such as requiring them to list the firm name or address.49 States have
not adopted rules specific to drug injury advertising. We are also aware of no
instance in which a state bar took action against an attorney for false or misleading
content in a drug injury ad.
In recent decades, state bars have not aggressively enforced prohibitions on
false or misleading advertising. A 2002 study by Frank Zacharias found high levels
of non-compliant attorney advertising in the local phone book and virtually no
efforts on the part of state bars to enforce them. 50 Consequently, the case law that
has developed by state bars for assessing compliance with the prohibition on false
or misleading advertising tends to be somewhat sparse. State ethics boards have
found that content suggesting the advertisement has a public purpose-such as
"legal helpline" or "public service"--is misleading because it suggests a charitable
or government affiliation. 51 Likewise, attorney advertising can be misleading
where its format serves to obscure its purpose, such as a print ad labeled "public
service announcement" advising drivers on behavior at drunk driving
checkpoints. 52 Similarly, a website offering to "match" consumers with attorneys
after filling out a form was deemed misleading because it did not disclose that
consumers would be matched with the attorney who purchased the exclusive right
to receive referrals form a particular zip code. 53 Nevertheless, because drug injury
advertisements have never been the subject of state ethics opinions, it is difficult
to know how state bars would apply their rules to drug injury advertising.
Attorney advertising is protected under the First Amendment as commercial
speech. The First Amendment places an outer limit on states' ability to regulate
drug injury advertising. State regulation of attorney advertising must pass the
Central Hudson test: the state must "assert a substantial interest" that is "directly
advance[d]" by the speech restriction, which cannot be "served as well" through a
48. Tippett, supra note 2, at 3.
49. Id. at 32; see also 2015 Report of the Regulation of Lawyer Advertising Committee, supra
note 9, at 21.
50. Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertising as a
Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 985984-86
(2002).
51. Tippett, supra note 2, at 33-34 (citing S.C. Bar Ass'n Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory
Op. 13-05 (2013), 2013 WL 7196338, at * 1; Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Informal Op.
01-03 (2001), 2001 WL 694581, at *3; StateSt. Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof'I Responsibility
& Conduct, Formal Op. 2004-167 (2004), 2004 WL 3079032, at *2).
52. Tippett, supra note 2, at 35; Fla. Bar v. Doe, 634 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 1994).
53. Tippett, supra note 2, at 33-34; N.J. Comm. on Att'y Adver., Internet Adver., Misleading
Content, & Impermissible Referral Servs., N.J. CTS. (June 28, 2011),
https://www.njcourts.gov/notices/201 1/ni 10629a.pdf.
54. Bates v. St. Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977).
18:2 (2019)
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"more limited restriction on commercial speech., 55 However, false or misleading
speech is not protected under the First Amendment.5 6
In assessing state regulation of attorney advertising, the Supreme Court has
on occasion opined as to whether it considered particular content misleading. In
the 1985 Zauderer case, the Supreme Court did not require that a statement be
overtly false to qualify as misleading. 57 Rather, a statement can be misleading
through omission. The Court deemed the statement, "if there is no recovery, no
legal fees are owed" misleading because it failed to disclose that the consumer
would be liable for costs. 58 In doing so, the court looked past the literal content of
the statement, which was truthful-in fact, no legal fees would be owed absent
recovery. Instead, the Court considered the implication of the statement, and
reasoned that consumers would infer from the statement that they would incur no
out-of-pocket costs in connection with the litigation. 59 The Court reached this
conclusion without extrinsic evidence that individuals were actually misled,
reasoning: "When the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is in this case,
we need not require the State to 'conduct a survey of the... public before it [may]
determine that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead."' However, if the
misleading character of a statement is not apparent, it must be supported by some
evidence of deception or harm.6"
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") also has jurisdiction over attorney
advertising.61 Its authority derives from the FTC Act, which provides that "unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. ' 62 False
advertising that is "misleading in a material respect" is included in the Act's
definitions of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 63 The FTC's broad purpose
is not limited to protecting employees from purchases arising from deception, but
55. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
56. Id. at 576.




60. Peel v. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 106 (1990); see also
Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof 1 Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S, 136, 145 (1994).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 52 (2012); 15 U.S.C. §45 (2012). In an interview with a Wall Street Journal
reporter, an FTC official conceded that the agency has jurisdiction over drug injury ads and stated
that the agency has "never pursued an investigation or action against mass tort attorney ads ...."
Sara Randazzo & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Have You or Your Loved Ones Been Hurt by This Ad?
Congressman Wants to Know, WALL STREET JOURNAL (April 14, 2017, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/have-you-or-your-loved-ones-been-hurt-by-this-ad-congressman-
wants-to-know- 1492162205.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 52.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 55 (2012). See also JOHN SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 47 (2013).
12
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rather to broadly safeguard "consumer sovereignty. ' 64 Consequently, the FTC has
broad jurisdiction over all forms of broadcast advertising, including advertising
from lawyers. However, the FTC has generally declined to intervene regarding
attorney advertising, consistent with its stated policy of deferring to state and local
65agencies.
The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") has not regulated drug injury
advertising, although it regulates direct to consumer pharmaceutical advertising,
which contains some of the same content. In fact, the FDA may not have
jurisdiction over drug injury advertising because its authority only extends over
advertising that is "issued or caused to be issued by the manufacturer, packer, or
distributor with respect to that drug."
66
Overall, state attorney ethics boards are most clearly responsible for regulating
attorney advertising, which are subject to rules regarding false and misleading
content. However, this regulation is somewhat theoretical in the sense that they
have never been specifically applied to drug injury advertisers through disciplinary
proceedings or opinion letters.
This study, in addition to filling gaps in the scientific literature, serves to
answer two questions relevant to legal policy making. In particular, are consumers
actually misled by drug injury advertising, and are some advertisements more
misleading than others? If the answer to either question is no, it would suggest a
poor case for regulatory action. If consumers are not misled, there is no harm for
regulators to address. Conversely, if consumers are misled regardless of the
content, regulation would in some sense be futile, as no improvements to the
content of the ads would be beneficial for consumers. But if consumers are misled,
and the deception can be attributed to the content of the ad, nudging advertisers
toward less deceptive content might ultimately benefit consumers.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Research on drug injury advertisements is quite limited. A handful of studies
have been conducted on the influence of drug injury advertisements involving
pelvic mesh, which has been the subject of considerable advertising volume. A
survey-based study by Koski et al. asked urology patients how they first learned
64. In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984).
65. Tippett, supra note 2, at 13, 40 ("[T]he FTC has not inserted itself into the regulation of
attorney advertising beyond commenting on proposed attorney advertising rules that it deems overly
restrictive"); FED. TRADE COMM'N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: A GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS,
GENERAL ADVERTISING POLICIES (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/advertising-faqs-guide-small-business ("The FTC concentrates on national
advertising and usually refers local matters to state, county, or city agencies"); Randazzo & Rockoff,
supra note 61.
66. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act, § 502(n) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2018)).
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about pelvic mesh. 67 Those who recalled first learning about the mesh through drug
injury ads expressed more doubts about its safety. 68 Patients in Koski's study also
indicated that drug injury ads were more influential than other sources of
information, including medical professionals. 69 A study by Tenggardjaja et al.
suggested that drug injury ads may both inform and misinform viewers.70 Patients
that reported getting their information primarily from television (and were
presumably exposed to drug injury advertising) were more likely to remember
FDA announcements regarding pelvic mesh. 71 However, they were also more
likely to incorrectly believe that pelvic mesh had been subject to a product recall
by the FDA.72
In a study co-authored with several physicians, we examined the relationship
between patient exposure to drug injury ads and perceptions of pelvic mesh.73 We
also asked patients about whether they previously had surgery involving pelvic
mesh and previous visits to a urologist.74 We found that exposure to drug injury
advertising was quite high-88% of respondents reported having seen a drug
injury advertisement involving pelvic mesh over the past six months. 75 The
frequency of exposure was also quite high, with 75% of respondents reporting
having seen such ads at least once per week. 76 Respondents had ambivalent
attitudes towards drug injury advertising, rating them roughly in the middle of the
scale we provided on credibility, reliability and truthfulness.77
Personal experience with pelvic mesh surgery was the best predictor of a
patient's perceptions - those who had undergone surgery reported that surgery
was less risky and more beneficial than other patients.78 Results suggested that
greater exposure to drug injury advertising predicted higher risk perceptions, but
did not reliably predict perceptions about the benefits of surgery. 79 By contrast, a
past visit with a urologist did not reliably predict patient risk perceptions. However,
67. Michelle Elaine Koski et al., Patient Perception of Transvaginal Mesh and the Media, 84
FEMALE UROLOGY 572, 576 (2014).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Christopher F. Tenggardjaja et al., Evaluation of Patients' Perceptions of Mesh Usage in
Female Pelvic Medicine and Reconstructive Surgery, 85 FEMALE UROLOGY 326, 327 (2015).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Elizabeth Tippett, Jesse King, Vincent Lucente, Sonia Ephraim, Miles Murphy & Eileen
Taft, Does Attorney Advertising Influence Patient Perceptions of Pelvic Mesh?, 111 UROLOGY 65,
70(2018).
74. Id. at 66.
75. Id. at 65.
76. Id. at 67.
77. Id. at 67.
78. Id. at 67.
79. Id. at 68.
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such patients tended to view mesh surgery as more beneficial. 80 The study provides
some insight into how patients process different sources of information relating to
medical risks. Patients appear to trust their own experience and knowledge above
all. However, when assessing information from third parties (doctors and drug
injury ads) they appear to be retaining the primary message conveyed by each
information source - in the case of doctors, the potential benefits of surgery, and
in the case of drug injury ads, the risks. It may also be that patients retain the
information that is novel from each source. Given the near universal exposure to
the ads, they may first learn about risks from drug injury ads, which they retain,
and which is reinforced through each viewing. Through a doctor's visit, they may
first learn about the benefits of treatment, which are largely omitted from drug
injury ads.8 '
Other studies have taken different methodological approaches. A study
sponsored by Jannsen Pharmaceuticals examined adverse event reports from the
FDA to identify cases in which patients appear to have stopped taking medication
in response to drug injury advertising.82 They identified thirty one patients that
suffered serious adverse events, including a stroke, blood clot, and paralysis.83
They also identified two patients that died. 84 A study by Tippett and Chen
examined one year of Medicare reimbursement data to assess whether prescription
rates changed following drug injury advertising. 85 The study found that drug injury
advertising was strongly correlated with FDA regulatory action involving the drug
at issue, such as a drug relabeling. 86 Results found that FDA action was associated
with a reduction in the level or trend of the prescription rate.87 However, no such
reduction in the level or trend was observed in connection with high rates of
attorney advertising. 88
Overall, extant research suggests that drug injury advertising might have an
influence on patient attitudes, and possibly behaviors. However, the observational
nature of the studies limits causal inferences to be drawn from them. The closest
study to establish a causal inference was perhaps the Jannsen Pharmaceuticals
80. Id. at 68.
81. Tippett, Medical Advicefrom Lawyers, supra note 2, at 21.
82. PAUL BURTON & W. FRANK PEACOCK, A MEDWATCH REVIEW OF REPORTED EVENTS IN
PATIENTS WHO DISCONTINUED RIVAROXABAN (XARELTO) THERAPY IN RESPONSE TO LEGAL
ADVERTISING 248 (Heart Rhythm Soc'y, vol. 2, 2016).
83. Id. It was unclear in the subcommittee hearings whether the doctors were describing the
same patients referenced in the Jannsen Pharmaceuticals study or whether they represented additional
cases. See Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 7 (testimony of Dr. Shawn Fleming); Subcomm. Hearing,
supra note 7 (testimony of Dr. Ilana Kutinsky).
84. Burton & Peacock, supra note 82 at 248.
85. Chen & Tippett, supra note 14, at 1170.
86. Id. at 1172.
87. Id. at 1172.
88. Id. at 1173.
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study of adverse event reports, which originated from a biased source, but
apparently traced the patient's decision making to attorney advertising.
Observational research is also limited in its ability to disentangle the effect of
different sources of information. Consumers receive drug information from
multiple sources beyond drug injury ads-the media, the internet, medical
professionals, the FDA, as well as family and friends. 89 Without experimental
research, it is difficult to measure the influence of each source on consumer
decision making. Lastly, extant research cannot measure the differential effects of
advertisements, which vary in content. For example, the previously discussed
content analysis of ads suggests that some ads are more misleading than others-
where many are transparent, others obscure their sources and purpose. 90 It may be
that the misleading ads influence consumer behavior to a greater extent than those
that are more transparent.
III. THEORETICAL MODEL
Although few studies have examined drug injury advertising specifically, the
field of marketing has developed sophisticated theory, supported by a body of
research, around how consumers process marketing messages and the various ways
in which consumers can be misled. We summarize the relevant theory from the
marketing field below and then describe how we apply that theory to the drug
injury context in our study design.
A. Insights from the Field of Marketing
The prevailing marketing theory for understanding consumer persuasion and
deception was articulated in a 1994 article by Marian Friestad and Peter Wright. 91
Friestad and Wright presented a "Persuasion Knowledge Model" ("PKM"), where
the advertiser engages in a "persuasion attempt" with respect to a consumer.92 In
their model, consumers do not approach these interactions with a blank slate.
Rather, consumers bring to bear their substantive knowledge about the topic, their
knowledge about the advertiser, as well as their knowledge about persuasion
tactics. 93 Consumers develop knowledge about persuasion tactics, the "how, when
and why marketers try to influence them," through folk knowledge and personal
experience. 94 This knowledge enables them to "cope" with persuasion attempts
89. Id. at 1171.
90. Tippett, Medical Advice from Lawyers, supra note 2, at 26.
91. Marian Friestad & Peter Wright, The Persuasion Knowledge Model: How People Cope
with Persuasion Attempts, 21 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 1, 1 (1994).
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 2-4.
94. Id. at 1.
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with greater sophistication over time. 95  Consumers "access persuasion
knowledge... whenever they want to understand what is going on as they observe
advertisements, sales presentation, or the behaviors of service providers."96
Consumers use their knowledge to "maintain control over the outcome[s] and
thereby achieve whatever mix of goals is salient to them."9 7 They identify a
persuasive attempt as such, and interpret and evaluate it based on what they know
about past persuasive attempts, the motives of the advertiser, and facts or
experiences that are inconsistent with what the agent is telling them. 98 Consumers
then apply various coping tactics in response, such as ignoring the message,
discounting it, or weighing it against counterarguments. 99 A coping attempt may
also occur prior to, 1° or following the message-such as conducting research to
investigate a marketer's claim. 0 1 Consumers also develop "tactic recognition
heuristics" through which they use "one or two features of a persuasion attempt"
to identify a particular tactic-for example, "the presence of... a celebrity,
someone in a business suit, or someone shown in a laboratory - signals that the
advertiser is trying to get me to trust what they say." 10
2
Friestad and Wright also introduce a concept known as the "change of
meaning" principle, referring to the moment a consumer recognizes the persuasive
intent of an interaction or identifies the tactic used in a persuasive attempt. 103 This
flash of recognition changes the meaning of the message consumers receive and
how they respond. A consumer might process a message naively until the consumer
recognizes a persuasive tactic, which then colors the consumer's interpretation of
the whole encounter (the "change of meaning"). 104 Once the change of meaning
occurs, the consumer might apply a coping mechanism, such as ignoring or
dismissing the message. Following the change of meaning, the consumer might
95. Id. at 3.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 3-4.
99. Id. at 5. Margaret Campbell, When Attention-Getting Advertising Tactics Elicit Consumer
Inferences of Manipulative Intent: The Importance of Balancing Benefits and Investments, 4 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 225, 248 (1995) (inferences of manipulative intent lowers persuasiveness of
the advertisement).
100. A consumer's "preexposure mindset" will also influence how they process the message.
DAVID BOUSH, MARIAN FRIESTAD & PETER WRIGHT, DECEPTION IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF DECEPTIVE PERSUASION AND CONSUMER SELF PROTECTION 107 (2009). For example,
a consumer will interpret an advertisement differently when primed to watch for persuasion-related
contents versus other content. Amna Kirmani & Rui Zhu, Vigilant Against Manipulation: The Effect
of Regulatory Focus on the Use of Persuasion Knowledge, 44 J. MARKETING RES. 688, 695-96
(2007).
101. Friestad & Wright, supra note 91, at 11.
102. Id. at 11.
103. Id. at 12-13.
104. Id. at 13.
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also change his/her opinion of the advertiser, similar advertisements, and the
product at issue. ' 0 5 As Schul later theorized, a change of meaning tends to color
the consumer's assessment of the entire persuasive attempt, not just the portion of
the message'0 6 that may be deceptive. The degree to which a consumer will
discount a message following a change of meaning will depend on how much the
consumer believes he has been influenced by the message and the extent to which
that influence is consistent with the consumer's goals. 107 A consumer that believes
he or she has been strongly influenced by a message inconsistent with the
consumer's goals will discount that message to a much greater extent than if they
believes that they were not influenced or that the direction of influence was helpful
for achieving his or her goals.
The "change of meaning" principle explains why consumers vary in how they
respond to a given marketing message and also why even small changes in
marketing messages result in different responses. For example, a recommendation
from a friend may be perceived as helpful suggestion, but this perception may
change if you know your friend is receiving money for generating referrals.
Friestad and Wright explain, "[s]omeone who is deflected from using their tactic
knowledge will behave differently than they do when they can actively use that
knowledge. When an [advertiser]'s general persuasive intent.., is successfully
obscured by the [advertiser], a [consumer's] thinking and behavior may differ from
their thinking and behavior in situations in which the same feature is used but the
[advertiser's] intent is apparent." 108
The PKM also explains why consumer responses may differ following repeat
exposure to the message-a consumer sensitized to the persuasive intent in a
particular ad incorporates that into their knowledge about the advertiser, and
applies the same level of skepticism to future advertisements from that source. 109
However, consumers are also vulnerable to a countervailing psychological
principle known as the "truth effect," where they tend to infer that a statement is
more truthful following repeated exposure to it. 110
105. Id.
106. BOUSH ET AL., supra note 100, at 97; Yaacov Schul et al., How People Cope With
Uncertainty Due to Chance or Deception, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL., 91, 101 (2007) (when
study participants instructed that the some of the results of the game they were playing may have
been the result of deception, participants essentially ignored other information that otherwise would
have been helpful in winning the game).
107. BOUSH ET AL., supra note 100, at 97. By contrast, consumers have difficulty discounting
messages they believe were not very effective. Id. at 98.
108. Friestad & Wright, supra note 91, at 14.
109. Peter R. Darke & Robin J.B. Ritchie, The Defensive Consumer: Advertising Deception,
Defensive Processing, and Distrust, 44 J. MARK. REs. 114, 114 (2007) ("deceptive advertising
engenders distrust, which negatively affects people's responses to subsequent advertising from both
the same source and second-party sources.").
110. Hal Arkes, Lawrence Boehm & Gang Xu, Determinants of Judged Validity, J.
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Following the PKM, marketing researchers have sought to identify "the
situational factors that suppress otherwise accessible persuasion knowledge" as
well as advertising "behavior[s] that disguise a tactic.""1 ' Marketing theory further
elaborates upon different types of deceptive tactics, intended to impede a
consumer's ability to apply appropriate coping strategies. The following deception
tactics are particularly relevant to the drug injury advertising context:
"Misrepresentations of bad things that might happen if the consumer does
[not] buy the marketed product." 1 2 This decoying tactic works by creating
"mental simulations of future events"-consumers then consider how
these imagined futures might be avoided or obtained through their
actions." ' These simulations tend to rely heavily on fear-based and
threatening messaging," 4 "lay[ing] out an oversimplified, inaccurate, and
often downright dangerous set of actions" that could have been avoided
by heeding the advertiser's message. 15
* Fear appeals. Fear appeals encompass advertising that features some form
of threat. The "threat is an appeal to fear, a communication stimulus that
attempts to evoke fear response by showing some type of outcome that
audience (it is hoped) wants to avoid."' 16 Existing research suggests that
fear appeals increase interest in the advertisement and are persuasive. 1 7
The use of emotional content focuses and holds consumers' attention. 118
* "Mimicking: showing the false through imitation[.]" ' 19 For example,
imitating language or design elements used by a trusted source in order to
mislead customers.
* The "Omega strategy"-reducing consumer resistance to the message.
One means of doing so is to "redefine the sales interaction," for example,
"an insurance agent [that] calls not to sell you insurance, but to help you
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL., 576, 587 (1991); Alice Dechene et al., The Truth about the Truth: A
Meta-Analytic Review of the Truth Effect, 14 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev., 238, 238 (2010).
111. Friestad & Wright, supra note 91, at 14.
112. BOUSH ET AL., supra note 100, at 43.
113. Id. at 60.
114. Id. at 61.
115. Id. at 61.
116. Sara J. Blissm, Robin L Snipes & Michael S. LaTour, Don't be Afraid to Use FearAppeals:
An Experimental Study, 36 (2) J. ADVERTISING RES. 59-68 (1996).
117. Id; Mike Allen & Kim Witte, A Meta-analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective
Public Health Campaigns, 27 (5) HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 591-615 (2000).
118. Annie Lang, Byungho Park, Ashley N. Sanders-Jackson, Brian D. Wilson, & Wang Zheng,
Cognition and Emotion in TV Message Processing: How Valence, Arousing Content, Structural
Complexity, and Information Density Affect the Availability of Cognitive Resources, 10 (3) MEDIA
PSYCHOL. 317-38. (2007).
119. BOUSH ET AL., supra note 100, at 44.
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assess the ways your assets might be at risk."120
* "Incorporat[ing] fake cues that misleadingly imply "authority" to
consumers ... creat[ing] the impression that this speaker is a true authority
on the topic... [to] create a favorable state of mind."' 12 1
* Framing effects-"focus[ing] on only one or a few aspects of a more
complex decision problem" and "representing the losses and risks
associated with a product in a biased and incomplete way[.]' 122
* Deceptive implied claims. Marketing research suggests that consumers
"treat strongly implied (probabilistic) claims as equivalent to directly
asserted (certain) claims, as they store the claims in memory."1
23
120. Eric Knowles & Jay Linn, Alpha and Omega Strategies for Change, in RESISTANCE AND
PERSUASION 123 (2003).
121. BOUSH ET AL., supra note 100, at 50. The use of authority to persuade originates from
Robert Cialdini's book, Influence (1984). The FTC regulates some appeals to authority through what
is known as the "substantiation doctrine," where advertisers must have a factual basis for claims,
where the amount of evidence required to support a claim depends on the type of claim made.
SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 63, at 67. In particular, when advertisers suggest their claims are backed
by scientific evidence - through use of phrases such as "tests prove" or "studies show," the FTC
expects such claims to be backed up by "two well-controlled clinical studies, or 'competent and
reliable scientific evidence." Sterling Drug Inc. v. F.T.C., 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984). For
example, in an advertisement for aspirin, the FTC noted visual aspects of the advertisement that
suggested scientific support for the advertisers claims that it was superior to competitor products. Id.
The visuals suggested such support by including pictures of unspecified medical and scientific
reports, and through the use of a "serious tone" or "scientific aura" and a background of shelves
holding "ponderous books." Id. Similarly, in a case against pomegranate juice maker POM
Wonderful, the advertiser suggested that it is just "prevented or reduced the risk of heart disease,
prostate cancer and erectile dysfunction." In re POM Wonderful, LLC, F.T.C. Docket 9344, Final
Decision & Order, January 10, 2013, www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9344/index.shtm. This suggestion
arose in part from "express language about study results" but also "medical imagery such as a blood
pressure cuff, or the depiction of the caduceus, a well-recognized symbol of the medical profession."
In that case, the FTC applied the two-well controlled clinical studies standard.
122. BOUSH ET AL., supra note 100, at 62. See also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC & AMOS
TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982).
123. BOUSH ETAL., supra note 100, at 165. The Federal Trade Commission prosecutes deceptive
implied claims. For example, it found foodmaker Kraft in violation of the FTC Act for the implied
claim that its cheese slices "contained the same amount of calcium as five ounces of milk" and that
they "contain more calcium than do most imitation cheese slices." Kraft Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311
(1992). Although they did not make either statement explicitly, Kraft implied as much through a
visual image of milk pouring into a glass until it reached 5 ounces, which then turns into a package
label for the cheese. Id. at 315. The advertising also stated that Kraft "has five ounces per slice" -
which was an accurate depiction of product ingredients but failed to take into account the loss of
calcium during processing. Id. The ads also included the statement that competitors had "hardly any"
milk, alongside a nearly empty glass of milk. Id at 316. That implication, the FTC claimed, was false
because each individual slice only contained 70% as much calcium as 5 ounces of milk. Id. at 315.
The implication that competitor slices contained substantially less milk was also inaccurate. Id. at
316. The FTC deemed the implied claims material, because they involved health claims, which are
likely to be important to consumers. Id.
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* "Deceptive disclosure tactics" which, "[a]ppea[r] to disclose something
while really trying to conceal it." This primarily consists of delaying
disclosure as long as possible, delaying the consumer's suspicion of
deception as long as possible, or delaying the consumer's discovery that
"no meaningful disclosure" will be made. 124 The purpose of doing so is to
forestall the disclosure until "earlier deception tactics ha[ve] created a
solidified favorable inclination" toward the advertiser's message. 2 5 This
might involve "distract[ing] consumers away from the damaging
disclosure" through size, vividness, noise, novelty, or stimuli "related to
basic wants and needs, such as safety."
12 6
B. Applying Marketing Insights to the Drug Injury Context
The PKM offers a number of insights that can be applied to drug injury
advertising. First, the PKM suggests that consumers are not helpless when
confronted with drug injury advertising. The folk knowledge and personal
experience consumers have acquired enables them to evaluate medical information
from an attorney advertisement differently from personal advice they receive from
a doctor. While consumers infer a doctor's advice is based on their medical
expertise (and unlikely to be primarily motivated by profit), they might consider
medical information from a lawyer with greater skepticism. The PKM also
suggests that consumers are better equipped to evaluate drug injury advertising
when they have a clear sense of the sponsor's identity and the sponsor's pecuniary
motive. They may use knowledge about the sponsor and their persuasive intentions
to discount or ignore certain information. Their knowledge about the sponsor may
also lead them to be more vigilant regarding persuasion tactics, and more likely to
experience a change of meaning in connection with the advertising.
However, consumers may be limited in their ability to cope with the message
and apply their persuasion knowledge where the advertiser uses deceptive tactics,
as previously summarized. Many drug injury advertisements appear to contain
numerous deceptive tactics, sometimes in combination. They often include some
element of fear appeals, through repetition of the medical adverse events
associated with the drug in question. The adverse event often appears in large font
on the screen, as well as in the narration. Advertisers also use visuals to represent
these adverse events, such as a picture of a man clutching his chest overlayed with
a picture of a heart monitor; a picture of a figure lying in a hospital bed with a
concerned loved one sitting by their bedside; or an x-ray image of a skeleton. These
advertisements also provide mental simulations of the adverse events, asking
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viewers if they have taken the drug, and then referring to the medical events, and
suggesting that one follows the other. The heavy focus on adverse events also
represents a framing effect, where the focus is exclusively on the risks of the drug,
sometimes without any reference to the condition it serves to treat, the benefits it
might provide, or the risks associated with discontinuing the medication.
Drug injury advertising also commonly includes misleading appeals to
authority, suggesting that the advertisement, or the information in the advertising
originates from the government, or medical authorities. The spokesperson for the
ad will sometimes appear in what appears to be a surgical suite or some form of
hospital or treatment center. Other times, a spokesperson in a suit appears next to
text on a screen, mimicking the format of a television newscast. Advertisements
sometimes reference the "FDA" or use the term "medical alert." They also
sometimes include medical symbols and imagery, diagrams of the human body
depicting internal organs or veins, or footage of a surgery. The extreme form of
such appeals to authority represent a form of mimicry of non-advertising formats,
or even an Omega strategy that masks the persuasive goal-suggesting the
advertising has a public purpose rather than a pecuniary one.
Deceptive disclosure tactics are also common among drug injury
advertisements, with disclaimers in small font such as "this is an advertisement."
As previously discussed, some ads that mimic public service announcements also
delay disclosing their sponsor until the end. Although a later disclosure would
theoretically trigger a "change of meaning" that could prompt consumers to
reconsider the entire advertisement, the deceptive content may also inhibit
consumers from experiencing a change of meaning at all. Overall, drug injury
advertising tends to do a poor job of conveying the advertiser's referral-based
profit motive. At best, advertisements may include subtle references to referrals
through disclaimers in small print at the end of the advertisement, or make
reference to a "network of attorneys." In the absence of transparent disclosures of
the attorneys' pecuniary motives, clearly identifying an ad as associated with a
particular law firm, or making frequent reference to attorneys, a law firm, lawyers
or lawsuits at least allows consumers the opportunity to identify a lawyer as the ad
sponsor and consider their own skepticism towards lawyers generally. Consumers
can then better cope with the advertisement and evaluate all of the ad's content
with enhanced scrutiny.
The PKM also explains some of the observed results in extant research on
drug injury advertising. Consumers appear to respond differently to drug safety
information depending on the content of the information they receive, the source
from which it is received, and their reaction to the persuasive tactics used.
Consistent with our Urology study, patients appear to have incorporated benefit-
related information from conversations with their doctors, while incorporating
risk-based information from the drug injury advertisements. Consumers also
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appear to approach drug injury advertisements with some skepticism. The small
absolute number of patients reported in the Jannsen Pharmaceutical study who
discontinued their medication and later suffered an adverse medical event could
mean that many patients choose to ignore or discount the information in drug injury
advertisements because they disbelieve the source of the medical information.
Lastly, the marketing literature provides some insight into the results from the
Tippett and Chen study on Medicare drug prescription rates. Consumers appeared
to respond differently to the same information when it originated from the FDA
versus drug injury advertising. FDA action produced a negative trend in
prescriptions, which was not observed for drug injury advertising. Consumers-
and the doctors who prescribe their medication-perceive the FDA to be a more
credible source of information than attorney advertisers. Consumers then act on
FDA information, while taking a more measured or cautious approach when
similar information is conveyed through drug injury advertising.
The current research serves to apply marketing theory to the drug injury
advertising context more directly. First, extant research on drug injury advertising
has treated drug injury advertising in a monolithic way. 127 However, some ads
contain considerably more deceptive content than others. As previously discussed,
some drug injury ads are very transparent from the outset that they originate from
an attorney ("transparent ad"), while others seem to masquerade as public service
announcements ("deceptive ad"). Marketing theory predicts that consumers will
respond differently to the ads containing deceptive content because they will
struggle to recognize the persuasive intent or tactics used by the advertiser. Ads
employing more deceptive tactics will have a greater influence on consumer risk
perceptions and attitudes because consumers will have more difficulty applying
their persuasion knowledge and source knowledge in that context. Our first
experiment thus compares how consumers respond to a transparent ad compared
to a deceptive ad. We predict that consumers are more likely to be deceived by an
ad using deceptive tactics than a more transparent ad. We test this hypothesis by
asking viewers to identify the sponsor of the ad and then measuring the frequency
with which they answer the question correctly.
We also assess whether educational efforts can mitigate or offset deceptive
content. Marketing research suggests that deceptive content prevents consumers
from experiencing a "change of meaning" regarding persuasion tactics used
against consumers. Where consumers do not experience a change of meaning, they
are much less likely to discount the medical information conveyed in the
advertisement. Marketing theory would predict that an educational intervention-
in our case, a set of written instructions prior to viewing the ad-would help
inoculate viewers against persuasion tactics, essentially furnishing a "change of
127. Chen & Tippett, supra note 14; Koski, supra note 67; Tenggardjaja, supra note 70.
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meaning" prior to viewing the ad. Consequently, marketing research would predict
that participants who received the educational intervention would be less affected
by the medical information in the drug injury advertisement.
In our second study, we attempt to measure whether drug injury advertising
influences risk perceptions beyond a level that is warranted by medical evidence.
Although prior research finds some evidence of increased risk perceptions from
drug injury advertisements, it does not differentiate between warranted and
unwarranted increases in risk. We disaggregate the two by measuring a so-called
"spillover effect," which refers to increased risk perceptions among patient
populations unaffected by the particular risk. 28 Spillover effects are typically
observed where a particular drug risk only affects a small subpopulation, but others
outside that population behave as though the risk affects them. For example,
following FDA warnings about a suicide risk for teenagers taking antidepressants,
prescription rates dropped for the general population. 129 In our second study, we
test for a spillover effect by presenting participants with a drug injury ad involving
the antidepressant, Paxil, which is purported to present a risk to the fetus of
pregnant women. To the extent that participants who are not female believe they
have an increased risk after seeing the drug injury ad, it would suggest a spillover
effect.
Lastly, in this second study we also investigate how consumers respond to
different sources of drug safety information by comparing participant responses to
drug injury advertisements to their responses to Direct-To-Consumer (DTC)
pharmaceutical advertising, which contains some content similar to drug injury
advertising, but ultimately delivers the opposite message-that the drug at issue is
beneficial and safe. As the PKM suggests, consumers operate in complex media
environments, obtain their information from many sources, and apply their
persuasion knowledge to those sources. We expect that when shown alone, a DTC
advertisement will lead consumers to perceive a medication as more favorable,
offering more benefits and posing fewer risks. 130 We expect a drug injury
advertisement to produce the opposite effects, reducing favorability and benefit
evaluations while increasing perceived risk. The combination of conflicting
information from viewing both the DTC and drug injury advertisements should
128. John Calfee, Public policy issues in direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs,
21 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 174 (2002); E. Ray Dorsey et al. Impact of FDA Black Box Advisory
on Antipsychotic Medication Use, 170 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 96(2010); Staci Dusetzina, et al., Impact
of FDA Drug Risk Communications on Health Care Utilization and Health Behaviors: A Systematic
Review, 50 MED. CARE 466 (2012); Robert Valuck, et al., Spillover effects on treatment of adult
depression in primary care after FDA advisory on risk of pediatric suicidality with SSRIs, 164 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1198 (2007).
129. Valuck et al., supra note 128.
130. Ali Alhakami, Melissa Finucane, Stephen Johnson & Paul Slovic, The Affect Heuristic in
Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 (1) J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 1-17 (2000).
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become integrated, leading to risk judgments that are higher than the DTC
advertisement alone would produce but lower than the drug injury advertisement
alone would produce. Exposing consumers to one or both of the two types of ads
in an experimental setting allows us to test the effect of each.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Study 1.
Our first study contrasts two real drug injury advertisements involving the
drug Reglan (metoclopramide). Both ads were broadcast on television (see
Appendix B for a transcript and images from each advertisement). Both of the
advertisements are around 30 seconds long. Each ad warns viewers that Reglan is
associated with tardive dyskinesia and that consumers injured by Reglan may have
a claim for financial compensation. The transparent advertisement features the
sponsoring attorney's name in a phone number appearing in large font on the
bottom quarter of the screen (1-800-Call-Ken) and remains on the screen
throughout the advertisement. The name of the sponsoring attorney's law firm
appears in a small font above the phone number ("transparent Reglan
advertisement"). The sponsoring attorney also appears during the advertisement
and identifies himself as "attorney Ken Nugent."
By contrast, the deceptive advertisement does not reveal that it is sponsored
by a law firm until the last two seconds of the advertisement and only does so in
barely legible font on the bottom of the screen ("deceptive Reglan advertisement").
Although the deceptive advertisement prominently features a telephone number
throughout the advertisement, the number does not reveal the sponsor of the
advertisement (1-800-CAUTION). The deceptive advertisement begins with the
words "CAUTION" appearing in bright red letters. The ad then asks if the viewer
has taken Reglan, and describes the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia. One portion
of the deceptive advertisement includes a picture of a man apparently doubled over
in pain. We expect the cautionary language and imagery, combined with the
delayed and inconspicuous disclosure of the advertisement's sponsor, to obscure
the persuasive intent of the deceptive advertisement.
We predict that consumers may misidentify the purpose and sponsor of the
deceptive ad relative to the transparent one. To the extent consumers misidentify
the sponsor of the advertisement as an entity other than a lawyer, they may be more
likely to avoid seeking treatment or discontinue otherwise beneficial treatment. In
this study, we test if behavioral intentions towards using Reglan differ between the
two advertising types.
We further predict that educational efforts to explain the purpose of the
advertising may increase the likelihood that consumers correctly identify the
18:2 (2019)
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purpose of the advertisements. As such, Study 1 also considers different
educational efforts. One educational effort focuses on the positive benefits of
attorney advertising, in educating the public, providing redress for victims and in
holding pharmaceutical companies accountable for undisclosed risks. The other
focuses on the pecuniary motives of the ad's sponsor, describing how attorney
advertisers profit through their referrals or by recovering a contingency fee when
the case is settled or litigated. Also included is a control group that does not receive
any educational information about the advertisements. We expect educational
efforts will increase the rate at which consumers correctly identify a lawyer as the
sponsor of a drug injury advertisement. We also expect that explaining the purpose
of these types of advertisements will lead consumers to feel less susceptible to the
side effects associated with the medications.
Participants. 381 native English speaking MTurk workers received $0.50
(U.S.) each for their participation. Of these, 12 participants (3.15% of sample) were
removed because they experienced problems with the task. Slightly more men
(54.2%) participated and the mean age of participants was 35 (range: 18 to 79
years).
Procedure. The study featured a 3 (instructions: control vs. profit motive vs.
pro-consumer motive) x 2 (advertisement type: transparent vs. deceptive) between
participants design. All participants initially received instructions that they would
be viewing a television advertisement.
Those assigned to either instruction condition (profit motive or pro-consumer
motive) received instructions explaining that the advertisement was sponsored by
a lawyer and that the purpose of the advertisement was to "recruit consumers for a
lawsuit." In both conditions, participants were instructed that "consumers harmed
by the medication may have a valid lawsuit against the drug manufacturer for
failing to disclose the risk of the medical problem."
Those assigned to the profit motive condition were also informed that
advertising lawyers usually refer the case to other attorneys and are compensated
based on the volume of referrals their advertising generates. Those assigned to the
pro-consumer motive condition were instructed that the advertisements are
beneficial for consumers because they recover money for injured patients and
inform the public about important drug safety information. Finally, those assigned
to the control condition did not receive any information about the purpose of the
advertisement and were instead told that they would watch an advertisement that
had run during an episode of "Dancing with the Stars" and were provided a
description of the television show (see full instructions of each condition in
Appendix A).
After reading the instructions, participants were shown either the transparent
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Reglan advertisement or the deceptive Reglan advertisement.
Measures. After viewing the advertisements, all participants were asked to
evaluate the risks (not at all risky / very risky), benefits (not at all beneficial / very
beneficial) and their overall attitudes (I like it / I dislike it; Favorable / Unfavorable;
Good / Bad) towards Reglan on 7pt scales. In addition, participants were asked to
"Consider if you, personally, took Reglan. What is the percentage chance that you
would develop tardive dyskinesia?"
In order to evaluate if participants understood the source of the advertisement
they watched, they were asked to identify the sponsor of the advertisement.
Options included: "The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)," "the government,"
"an attorney or law firm," "a pharmaceutical company," "I don't know," and an
open response "other" option. All options except "an attorney or law firm" were
coded as a misidentification.
Participants then answered a set of questions about how likely they were to
perform a set of behaviors if they "personally needed and were prescribed Regan"
(7pt scale; Very unlikely/ Very likely). These items included two items related to
using the medication ("Fill a new prescription for Reglan from your doctor" and
"Refill a prescription for Reglan that you are already taking") and three items
relating to additional research on the medication: ("Research Reglan to learn more
about the medication," "Ask your doctor about the advertisement," and "Call the
number in the advertisement.") Finally, all participants completed a measure of
advertising skepticism.' 31
B. Study 2
In the second study we consider how drug injury advertisements and DTC
pharmaceutical ads, in combination and individually, might affect evaluations of a
medication. We also test for the previously discussed spillover effect by using ads
involving the anti-depressant, Paxil.
Participants. 389 native English speaking MTurk workers received $0.50
(U.S.) each for their participation. Of these, 5 participants (1.29% of sample) were
removed because they experienced problems viewing the videos. Of the remaining
384 participants, slightly more were women (52.9%) and the mean age of
participants was 35 (range 18 to 75 years). Three female participants indicated that
they were currently pregnant. 1
32
131. Carl Obermiller & Eric R. Spangenberg, Development of a Scale to Measure Consumer
Skepticism Toward Advertising, 7 (2) J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 159 (1998).
132. Note, these three pregnant women were included in the analyses reported in study 2. The
analyses were also performed without including these women and the reported pattern of significant
18:2 (2019)
27
King and Tippett: Drug Injury Advertising
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
DRUG INJURY ADVERTISING
Procedure. Participants were assigned to a 2 (DTC Advertisement: present vs.
absent) x 2 (Drug Injury Advertising: present vs. absent) between subjects' design.
All participants were informed that they would view two advertisements. First,
participants either watched an existing DTC advertisement for the medication
Paxil or an existing advertisement for a household surface cleaner (Clorox Clean-
Up). Then, participants either viewed an existing drug injury advertisement or an
existing advertisement for Dove soap. The drug injury advertisement focused on
recruiting women who used Paxil while pregnant and subsequently delivered a
child with birth defects. It was similar in format to the deceptive advertisement
featured in study 1 by featuring a number of warning statements, focusing on the
side effects of the medication and failing to disclose that the advertisement was
sponsored by an attorney until the end (the sponsoring attorney was only disclosed
in the onscreen text).
Measures. After viewing both advertisements, all participants were asked to
evaluate the risks, benefits and their overall attitudes towards Paxil using the same
scales from study 1. Items measuring behavioral intentions toward the same set of
behaviors as those in study 1 (e.g., "fill a new prescription for Paxil from your
doctor") were also included. In addition, participants were asked to estimate the
odds that they would experience side effects if they personally took Paxil.
Participants were asked to classify each advertisement they watched as (a) a
public service announcement, (b) a lawyer advertisement, (c) an advertisement
from a pharmaceutical company, (d) an advertisement for a cleaning product or (e)
an advertisement for soap. Finally, all participants completed the advertising
skepticism scale'33 that was used in the first study.
V. RESULTS
A. Study 1 Results
Sponsor of Advertising. A hierarchical binomial logistic regression was
conducted to assess whether the transparency of the advertisement, instructions
provided to the participants and the interaction between these two variables,
significantly predicted whether participants correctly classified the sponsor of the
advertisements as a lawyer or misidentified the sponsor. Misidentifications were
classified as either identifying the ad sponsor as someone other than a lawyer or
indicating "I don't know" when asked to identify the sponsor of the ad. See the
rates of correct and incorrect identification by condition in Table 2.
results do not change.
133. Id.
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Table 2. Rates of Correct & Incorrect Identification by Condition
Transparent Deceptive Total
Instructions Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
Control N 49 9 48 19 97 28
% 84.48% 15.52% 71.64% 28.36% 77.60% 22.40%
Profit N 56 1 56 12 112 13
Instructions % 98.25% 1.75% 82.35% 17.65% 89.60% 10.40%
Pro-Consumer N 58 7 47 7 105 14
Instructions % 89.23% 10.77% 87.04% 12.96% 88.24% 11.76%
Total N 163 17 151 38 314 55
% 90.56% 9.44% 79.89% 20.11% 85.09% 14.91%
The main effects logistic regression model was found to be statistically
significant, X2(3) = 16.36, p = .001. The model explained 7.6% (Nagelkerke R2) of
the variance in correctly classifying advertisements and correctly classified 85.1%
of cases. Results indicated that the different instruction conditions influenced the
likelihood of participants correctly identifying the advertisements; WaldX2(2) =
7.88, p = .0 19. Those assigned to the control condition misidentified the attorney
ads at a higher rate than those assigned to either the pro-consumer or profit
instruction conditions; b = -.83, Wald X 2(1) = 7.65, p = .006. There was no
significant difference in the rate at which participants correctly identifying attorney
advertisements between the pro-consumer and profit instruction conditions; b =
.22, Wald X 2(1) = .28, p = n.s. Those participants who received either the pro-
consumer or profit oriented instructions were 1.24 times as likely to correctly
classify the advertisement relative to those in the control instruction condition.
The transparency of the video also significantly influenced the likelihood of
correctly classifying the advertisement; b = .88, WaldX(l) = 7.75,p = .005. Those
encountering the transparent Reglan advertisement were 2.42 times more likely to
correctly classify the advertisement as those who encountered the deceptive
Reglan advertisement. The interaction between the transparency of the video and
instruction condition was not significant (p >. 10).
These results suggest that the instructional conditions improved the rate at
which participants correctly identified the source of the advertisement. They also
suggest that different educational messages may improve consumers' ability to
correctly identify the sponsor of different forms of drug injury advertisements.
Among deceptive advertisements that mimic public health warnings, educational
efforts that explain the pro-consumer benefits may improve identification. Among
transparent advertisements that are more clearly from a lawyer, educational efforts
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that describe how lawyers profit from the advertisements may be more effective.
Although not tested, it is possible that consumer education featuring both profit
and pro-consumer descriptions may improve consumers' ability to correctly
identify both types of drug injury advertisements.
Evaluations ofReglan. A series of 3 (instructions: control vs. profit motive vs.
pro-consumer motive) x 2 (advertisement type: transparent vs. deceptive) analyses
of covariance (ANCOVAs) with advertising skepticism, and gender as134
covariates were conducted for the variables measuring evaluations of Reglan (i.e.,
overall evaluation, risk, benefit). Gender was significantly related to both overall
attitudes and benefits, with women expressing more favorable attitudes towards
Reglan than men. However, neither the type of advertisement, nor form of
instruction was found to significantly affect any of the measures. These results
suggest that participants' evaluations of Reglan were not affected by the
advertising example (transparent vs. deceptive) they watched.
However, a main effect of instructional condition was observed on estimates
of how likely participants believed they were to develop tardive dyskinesia from
taking Reglan (F(2, 354) = 3.65, p = .03). Both those assigned to the profit motive
instructions (M = 20.77) and those assigned to the pro-consumer instructions
condition (M= 21.93) indicated that the likelihood of experiencing this side effect
was less than those assigned to the control condition (M= 28.17). In other words,
those who were not provided any instruction regarding the purpose of the
advertisement estimated that they were more likely to experience this adverse side
effect. No other significant effects were observed. This result suggests that
consumers may discount the personal risks associated with the medication when
they are made aware of the purpose underlying drug injury advertising.
Behavioral Intentions. Another set of ANCOVAs were conducted on the set
of behavioral intentions. A significant main effect of advertising type was observed
for both items related to using Reglan. Participants indicated that they were both
less likely to fill a new prescription for Reglan (F(1,358) = 9.26, p < .01) and to
refill an existing prescription (F(1,358) = 7.09,p < .01) for Reglan after watching
the deceptive Reglan advertisement relative to the transparent Reglan
advertisement. No other significant effects were observed. This result suggests that
advertisements framed as warnings (e.g., similar to the deceptive drug injury
advertisement used in this study) may encourage consumers to stop taking (or fail
to start taking) medications.
Providing instructions to participants produced an observable effect for one of
134. Note, these analyses were also performed with gender as a fixed factor and gender was not
found to significantly interact with any of the independent variables.
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the three behavior items relating to information seeking: intention to "research
Reglan to learn more about the medication"; F(2,354) = 3.65 , p = .027. Those
assigned to the control condition indicated that they were less likely to research the
medication (M = 5.82) than those assigned to the profit motive instruction
condition (M = 6.24). No significant differences were observed between the pro-
social instruction condition (M= 6.14) or either of the other two conditions. This
result suggests that educational efforts that focus on making consumers aware of
how lawyers may profit from drug injury advertising may encourage consumers to
learn more about the medications featured in those advertisements.
Overall, these results support our hypothesis that consumers may be confused
by certain drug injury advertisements. While the two advertisements did not lead
to different evaluations of the medication and its overall risks and benefits, those
who watched the deceptive advertisement indicated that they were less likely to
either fill a new prescription or refill an existing prescription for Reglan. This
finding is concerning because it suggests that after viewing drug injury
advertisements that appear to be public health warnings consumers may decide to
avoid taking the featured medication. The two instructional conditions were found
to improve the rate at which participants correctly identified the sponsor of the
drug injury advertisements but did not affect evaluations or behavioral intentions
towards the medication.
Providing information about the purpose of these advertisements was found
to increase the likelihood that participants would seek additional information about
the medication and to reduce the perceived likelihood of experiencing the primary
side effect discussed in the advertisements. Both of these effects are encouraging
as they suggest that educational efforts may lead consumers to discount apparent
warnings in drug injury advertising and encourage them to seek additional
information.
B. Study 2 Results
Sponsor of Advertising. Most participants (97.7% or 375 of 384) correctly
classified the first advertisement (97.9% for the DTC advertisement, and 97.5%
for the Clorox advertisement). In contrast, only 84% (323 of 384) of participants
correctly identified the second advertisement (93.7% for the soap advertisement
but only 75.1% for the drug injury advertisement). This finding supports those of
study 1, participants appear to be confused about the sponsor of the deceptive drug
injury advertisements.
Evaluations ofPaxil. A series of 2 (DTC advertisement: present vs. absent) x
2 (Drug injury advertising: present vs. absent) analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs)
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with advertising skepticism, and gender135 as covariates were conducted for the
variables measuring evaluations of Paxil (i.e., overall evaluation, risk, benefit).
The presence of a DTC advertisement increased perceived benefits (M= 4.57, SD
= 1.51) relative to when the DTC advertisement was not shown (M= 3.80, SD =
1.36); F(1, 367) = 28.49, p < .01. The presence of the drug injury advertisement
produced the opposite effect. Participants perceived Paxil to be less beneficial
when shown the drug injury advertisement (M= 3.77, SD = 1.54) than when the
advertisement was not shown (M= 4.56, SD = 1.31); F(1, 367) = 30.17,p < .01.
No DTC x Drug Injury Advertisement interaction was observed. No gender
differences on perceived benefits were observed.
Main effects were observed for the drug injury advertisement but not a DTC
advertisement on perceptions of risk. Those viewing the drug injury advertisement
perceived Paxil to be riskier (M= 5.32, SD = 1.40) than those who did not (M=
4.37, SD = 1.24); F(1,367) = 47.89, p < .01). There was also a main effect for
gender on risk perceptions. Women indicated that Paxil was riskier (M= 5.04, SD
- 1.38) than men (M = 4.63, SD = 1.41); F(1, 367) = 7.86, p = .01. These main
effects were qualified by a significant interaction between the DTC and Drug
Injury Advertisement factors (see Figure 4); F(1,367) = 4.66, p = .03. When the
drug injury advertisement was absent, the presence or absence of the DTC
advertisement did not affect risk. However as expected, viewing the DTC
significantly lowered risk perception among those also viewing the lawyer
advertisement (M= 5.07, SD = 1.39) relative to those who did not view the DTC
advertisement (M = 5.56, SD = 1.37). This finding suggests that the DTC
advertisement established knowledge structures regarding risks associated with
Paxil that were resistant to change from the drug injury advertisement. 136 However,
it is important to note that those who viewed the drug injury advertisement (in any
condition) indicated that Paxil was risker that those who did not view the drug
injury advertisement.
Table 3: Mean Risk Perceptions
Mean Risk
Ad Condition Perception
Drug injury ad only 5.56
Drug injury ad & pharmaceutical ad 5.07
No drug injury ad (with or without pharmaceutical ad) 4.37
135. Note, these analyses were also performed with gender as a fixed factor and gender was not
found to significantly interact with any of the independent variables.
136. Curtis P. Haugtvedt & Duane T. Wegener, Message Order Effects in Persuasion: An
Attitude Strength Perspective, 21 J. CONSUMER REs. 205-18 (1994).
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Favorability measures closely matched benefit perceptions. Significant main
effects for DTC (F(l, 367) = 15.42, p < .01) and Drug Injury Advertisements
(F(1,367) = 63.29, p < .01) were observed on favorability evaluations. Those
watching the DTC advertisement (M= 3.88, SD = 1.62) liked Paxil more than those
who did not see the DTC advertisement (M= 3.31, SD = 1.42). Conversely, those
who viewed the drug injury advertisement indicated that they held less favorable
attitudes of Paxil (M= 2.99, SD = 1.54) relative to those who did not see the drug
injury advertisement (M = 4.16, SD = 1.31). Again, no significant gender effects
were observed on attitudes towards Paxil.
A main effect of gender was observed on estimates of how likely participants
believed they were to develop experience side effects from taking Paxil (F(l, 364)
= 11.64, p < .01). Female participants (M= 33.87, SD = 26.66) indicated that they
were more likely to experience side effects from taking Paxil than men (M= 24.59,
SD = 25.36). No other significant effects were observed.
Behavioral Intentions. Another set of ANCOVAs were conducted on the set
of behavioral intentions. Significant main effects of the DTC Advertisement (Fnew
prescription (1,367) = 7.69, p =.01; Frefiui prescription (1,367) = 8.06, p < .01) and the Drug
Injury Advertisement (Fnew prescription (1,367) = 23. 8 3, p < .01; Frefill prescription (1,367)
- 14.99,p < .01) were observed for both items related to using Paxil. In both cases,
the DTC advertisement increased the likelihood that participants would fill, or
refill, a Paxil prescription, whereas the presence of the drug injury advertisement
decreased the likelihood that participations would fill, or refill, a Paxil prescription.
These main effects were qualified by a significant DTC x Drug Injury
Advertisement interaction for both items; Fnewprescription (1,367) = 9.62,p <.01; Frefiil
prescription (1,367) = 5.94, p = .02. Intentions to use Paxil closely mirrored the effects
observed among risk perceptions. In the absence of the drug injury advertisement,
the DTC advertisement had little effect on likelihood to fill or refill a prescription.
However, when the drug injury advertisement was shown, participants were less
likely to fill a prescription if they had not seen the DTC advertisement relative to
those who saw both the drug injury advertisement and the DTC advertisement.
This finding again suggests that the drug injury advertisement more strongly
increases perceived risk when not accompanied by a counterargument. Of the three
behavioral items related to further investigating the medication, the only
significant effect that was observed was that of the drug injury advertisement on
the intention to "ask your doctor about an advertisement;" F(1,367) = 16.52, p <
.01. Those who viewed the drug injury advertisement indicated that they were more
likely to talk to their doctor than those who did not see the drug injury
advertisement.
Findings from the second study reinforce those from the first by providing
clear evidence that deceptive drug injury advertisements are likely to be
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misidentified and serve to increase the perceived risks associated with the
medications they feature. The drug injury advertisement caused Paxil to be
perceived as riskier and participants indicated that they were less likely to start, or
continue taking, Paxil after viewing a drug injury advertisement. Importantly, these
effects were observed among consumers for which the risks featured in the drug
injury advertisement did not apply. Although women indicated greater risks and
likelihood of experiencing side effects if they took Paxil, the effect of the drug
injury advertisement on evaluations or behavioral intentions towards Paxil did not
depend upon gender. Thus, results suggest spillover effects from drug injury
advertisements into populations that are not susceptible to the advertised side
effects.
VI. DISCUSSION & REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS.
Results suggest that some consumers are in fact misled by drug injury
advertising. Of the four types of advertisements included in these studies-a DTC
pharmaceutical ad, a bleach advertisement, a soap advertisement and a drug injury
advertisement-the drug injury ads produced the highest rates of misidentification.
This was especially so for the deceptive ads. The deceptive Reglan ad in Study 1
produced misidentification rates of 28%, while the deceptive Paxil ad was
misidentified by 25% of participants. This misidentification rate is especially
striking given that the instrument did not ask participants to identify an individual
sponsor (e.g. The Law Firm of Ken Nugent), but just the type of advertisement
(e.g. "The first advertisement was a lawyer advertisement.")
Educational interventions were somewhat effective at reducing rates of
misidentification, both for the transparent advertisement and the deceptive
advertisement. Educational instructions about the attorney's profit motives for the
transparent ad brought misidentification rates down to levels similar to that for
DTC pharmaceutical advertising and for consumer products. However, for the
deceptive ad, educational instructions were only able to bring misidentification
levels down in the range of the transparent ad without disclosures.
When consumers are unable to recognize a drug injury ad as a form of attorney
advertising, it has important implications for their ability to process the persuasive
content. If they mistakenly believe, as some participants did, that the advertisement
is a public service or government announcement, or originates from the
manufacturer, they will process the medication information without the benefit of
important knowledge about the advertiser. Consumers may also be less likely to
apply their persuasion knowledge, on the assumption that the public entity has no
pecuniary motive, or perhaps that the manufacturer has been forced by a
government agency to issue corrective advertising. This too may limit their ability
to "cope" with the medical information.
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Table 4: Rates of Sponsor Misidentification in Studies 1 & 2
Rates of Sponsor
Type of Advertisement Misidentification
Transparent ad with education about attorney's profit motive 1.8%
Direct to consumer pharmaceutical advertising 2.1%
Advertisement for bleach 2.5%
Advertisement for soap 6.4%
Transparent ad with education about attorney's public service 10.8%
Deceptive ad with education about attorney's public service 12.9%
Transparent ad (no education) 15.5%
Deceptive ad with education about attorney's profit motive 17.6%
Deceptive ads (no education) 25% - 28%
These results also provide some support for the proposition that the deceptive
advertisement (especially with no additional disclosures) had a greater influence
on consumers than the transparent ad. Viewers of the transparent ad, or the
deceptive advertisement with additional disclosures, appear to have discounted the
risk-related information in the ad, evaluating the drug as less risky than those who
viewed the deceptive ad in isolation. The deceptive ad also had a stronger influence
on participants' willingness to fill a Reglan prescription, which was unaffected by
additional disclosures. However, one of the two disclosures did appear to increase
motivation to conduct further research.
Results also suggest that drug injury ads may actually be somewhat more
persuasive than DTC pharmaceutical ads, as an additional pharmaceutical ad did
not produce an observable difference in risk perceptions and behavioral intentions
compared to the control. By contrast, drug injury ads on their own had a strong
influence on risk perceptions and behavioral intentions, which were only
somewhat mitigated by pharmaceutical ads. How drug injury advertising is
affected by counterarguments remains an important direction for future research.
However, one explanation for the difference in the effects of drug injury
advertising relative to DTC advertisements may be related to the higher rate of
misidentification among the drug injury advertisements. As discussed above, if
consumers are unable to understand the persuasive intent and tactics of such
advertising, they are less able to effectively cope with those persuasive attempts.
Lastly, results suggest that deceptive ads may produce some spillover effects.
Paxil posed no risk for men based on the adverse event described in the drug injury
advertisement. Although men estimated they would be less likely to experience
side effects than women, and viewed Paxil as less risky, the drug injury
advertisement appears to have ultimately affected their behavioral intentions. Drug
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injury ads led both men and women to reduce their reported likelihood of filling or
refilling a prescription for the drug by statistically similar amounts. This suggests
that drug injury ads in some cases may lead to unwarranted increases in risk
perceptions and inappropriately influence the behavioral intentions of populations
for whom the risks presented in the advertisements do not apply.
The results offer a number of implications for regulating drug injury
advertisements. First, they offer some initial evidence in assessing the tradeoff
between regulation focused on reducing deceptive content versus regulation that
demands the inclusion of disclaimers. For example, the American Medical
Association has recommended that all drug injury advertisements include a
disclaimer that viewers should not discontinue medication without first consulting
their doctor. 137 These types of disclaimers may help consumers trigger their source
knowledge and persuasion knowledge and thereby consider the context in which
medical information is presented. However, disclaimers are also somewhat limited
in what they can achieve. The "disclaimers" used in Study 1 included a written
instruction that participants were told to review before watching the ads. This
likely represents a greater level of prominence and salience than the average
disclaimer would produce; most disclaimers are less conspicuous. The disclaimer
here was successful in helping participants identify the sponsor of the ad and also
proved helpful for the transparent ad. Nevertheless, the disclaimer did not mitigate
the influence of the deceptive ad on behavioral intentions towards filling a
prescription.
The differences observed between the transparent ad and the deceptive ad in
this case suggests that ad content can have a marked difference in how consumers
process the persuasive content of messages and ultimately on their behavioral
intentions. Regulators might usefully focus their efforts on reducing deceptive
content in drug injury advertisements. State bars could do so in a manner consistent
with the Association of Professional Ethics Lawyers' recommendation that state
bars simplify ethics rules by issuing a simple prohibition on false or misleading
content. 138 As an alternative to adopting new rules, state bars could simply step up
enforcement of rules prohibiting false or misleading advertising. Further, state bars
could issue advisory opinions applying the false or misleading standard to drug
injury ads. Finally, state bars could also selectively enforce the false or misleading
prohibition for the worst content on the market.
Doing so would require state bars to take the initiative to identify the worst
offenders and take action against them. This solution would require a change to
their current approach to disciplinary matters, which relies on complaints by clients
137. Press Release, Am. Med. Ass'n., AMA Adopts New Policies on Final Day of Annual
Meeting, (June 15, 2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/ama-adopts-new-policies-final-day-annual-
meeting.
138. 2015 Report of the Regulation of Lawyer Advertising Committee, supra note 9.
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and competitors. As discussed in prior research, neither clients nor competitors
have an incentive to complain about drug injury advertising.'39 Competitors of
drug injury advertisers are unlikely to complain in order to avoid drawing attention
to their own advertising practices. Consumers most likely to be harmed by the ads
are not potential clients injured by the drug, but consumers influenced by the ads
to reduce or discontinue a drug (or refuse a doctor's recommendation to begin
treatment). As we have discussed herein, these consumers may not even realize
that they have been influenced by the ads, or that the ads were in fact attorney
advertising. Had they been aware of the source of the ads and the advertisers'
pecuniary motives, they likely would have discounted the information and avoided
influence. Moreover, these consumers are unlikely to know or recall the name of
the advertiser's sponsor once they realize they have been influenced, and indeed,
the influence may have resulted from cumulative exposure to the advertising. Even
if they could identify a specific advertiser responsible for their decision, they
would not know to complain to the state bar, nor be able to identify the state in
which the firm is located. 1
40
However, states are somewhat limited in their ability to enforce prohibitions
on false and misleading advertising against the deceptive advertising described
here. First, the presence of corporate entities on the list of most prolific advertisers
creates a regulatory challenge for ethics boards. Corporate entities have no bar
license to threaten. Even referral networks present regulatory challenges. Although
theoretically made up of individual lawyers, it is not at all clear which of the
individual lawyers could or would be held responsible for the ads. Second, the
large advertising market described herein is national in nature. Consumers in many
states are affected by advertising originating from a firm in another state. Because
the primary threat wielded by state bars is the ability to revoke or suspend an
individual attorney's license, the non-licensing state is largely powerless to do
anything about the advertising.
Consequently, meaningful change may require help from the FTC. The FTC
can take action against the worst actors, whether they are law firms or corporate
entities. The FTC is better positioned to act with respect to national advertising
campaigns because its jurisdiction extends beyond individual states. The FTC also
brings considerable expertise in deceptive advertising, drawing upon its decades
of experience in that realm.
Lastly, further deregulation of attorney ethics rules around referral fees, when
coupled with stringent rules regarding disclosure, may help consumers activate
their persuasion knowledge in responding to drug injury ads. As previously
described in Part I, only some drug injury advertisers litigate cases with any
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frequency. Others would appear to generate revenue through complex referral
arrangements with litigators, styled as "joint representation." However, the nature
of these referral arrangements is not at all apparent from the advertisements
themselves. Although this non-disclosure may in part be a deceptive advertising
tactic, it may also reflect advertiser concern about running afoul of ethical rules
regarding referrals.
State rules regarding attorney referral fees vary somewhat, but have
historically prohibited referral fees that exceed reimbursement for advertising
costs. 141 In 2012, the ABA modified commentary to its Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 7.2, which allowed lawyers to purchase referrals through "lead generation
services." 142 Even assuming that drug injury advertisers qualify as "lead generation
services," the 2012 exception includes a number of limitations. The lead generator
cannot suggest that "it is recommending the lawyer" receiving the referral, nor that
it has "analyzed a person's legal problems when determining which lawyer should
receive the referral." 143 These limitations may be inconsistent with current referral
practices among drug injury advertisers. In addition, not all states permit the use
of "lead generation services," and apply stringent restrictions on referral
services. 144 In light of these restraints, drug injury advertisers may decide to
continue their complex fee-sharing arrangements,145 which are difficult to explain
to consumers.
Complex fee sharing arrangements-particularly when they are not
meaningfully disclosed in an advertisement--obscure advertisers' persuasive
intent. If consumers cannot glean the advertiser's pecuniary motive, or even that
they have a pecuniary motive, they will be less likely or able to bring their
persuasion knowledge to bear. This may account for some of the increased
influence of the deceptive ad compared to the transparent ad, and also why
providing consumers with education around the purpose of the ad helped to
mitigate the effect of the deceptive ad.
Overall, consumers would be best served if they clearly understood the
business model of the advertiser. Consumers generally have good mental schema
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r 7.2.
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r 7.2[5] cmt. (AM. BAR Ass'N 2017). See e.g., Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. Rules of Prof 1 Conduct 7.2 cmt. 5 (West 2017) (adopting ABA language); Ohio
rev. Code Ann., Rules of Prof 1 Conduct r 7.2 (West 2017).
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., MD RULES ATroitE's, r 19-307.2 (West 2017); VA. CODE
ANN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r 7.3 (Sest 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. RPC 7.2 (West 2017); N.M.
STAT. ANN. NMRA 16-701 (West 2017).
145. Fee sharing arrangements are also regulated by states, following ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.5. These rules require that "(1) the division is in proportion to the services
performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; (2) the
client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is
confirmed in writing; and (3) the total fee is reasonable."
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for understanding the motives of litigators. When they see a lawyer featured on a
screen looking for clients, they can infer that the lawyer benefits financially from
the additional business, whether it be from hourly fees or a contingency fee. This
essentially reflects the content of the "transparent" ad featured in our first study.
Ideally, a similar level of transparency could be applied for firms-and third party
corporations-that base their business primarily on referrals. This approach would
involve explaining to viewers that their business specializes in finding injured
consumers, and receiving a fee to refer them to other lawyers. Finders' fees and
referral fees represent a common business model in other industries, for example,
'headhunters' in the human resources context. Consumers have a context for
understanding these business arrangements, and can then place the medical
information within a larger narrative of the advertisers' business interests.
At least in the drug injury context, allowing such referral arrangements,
provided they are prominently conveyed to viewers in their advertising, would help
to mitigate some of the medical side effects of drug injury advertising. 146 In sum,
increased enforcement of existing prohibitions on false and misleading advertising,
when coupled with some deregulation of referral fee arrangements, would be
beneficial to consumers without impairing the market for drug injury advertising.
CONCLUSION
This study draws from theory and research in the marketing field to shed light
on how consumers respond to drug injury advertising. We find that deceptive drug
injury advertising has a stronger influence on consumers than transparent
advertising. Deceptive drug injury advertising may ultimately distort how
consumers make decisions about whether to take the drug featured in the ad.
Nevertheless, educational efforts, and counterarguments appear to mitigate some
of this effect.
Marketing theory suggests that some of the effect of the deceptive ads can be
explained by some consumers' failure to identify the advertiser and their pecuniary
motives. When consumers misunderstand the source of an advertisement, they may
not be able to apply their knowledge and skepticism of that source, and identify
the persuasive tactics used in the ad. Reducing the influence of drug injury
advertising may therefore involve interventions designed to make the advertiser's
motives more transparent. Further research is warranted on the particular content
within drug injury ads that is most harmful (or helpful) to consumers in processing
and responding to the medical information contained therein.
146. While we do not explore the effect of such a rule on other aspects of the consumer
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 INSTRUCTION CONDITIONS
Profit Motive Instructions
In a moment, you will watch an advertisement that was paid for by a lawyer.
The purpose of the advertisement is to recruit consumers for a lawsuit. In
particular, the lawyer is looking for consumers that experienced a particular
medical problem after taking a prescription drug. Consumers harmed by the
medication may have a valid lawsuit against the drug manufacturer for failing to
disclose the risk of the medical problem.
If the consumer has a valid lawsuit and contacts the lawyer in the
advertisement, the lawyer's firm might then represent the viewer in a lawsuit.
However, most advertising lawyers do not represent the consumers they recruit.
Instead, advertising lawyers often sell their names to other law firms that will
actually litigate the case.
The lawyers that run the advertisements are paid for their referrals. The more
consumers they recruit, the more they are paid. Other law firms are willing to pay
for referrals because they will eventually receive a portion of the money their
clients recover from drug manufacturers.
Pro-consumer motive instructions
In a moment, you will watch an advertisement that was paid for by a lawyer.
The purpose of the advertisement is to recruit consumers for a lawsuit. In
particular, the lawyer is looking for consumers that experienced a particular
medical problem after taking a prescription drug. Consumers harmed by the
medication may have a valid lawsuit against the drug manufacturer for failing to
disclose the risk of the medical problem.
These advertisements are beneficial for consumers for a number of reasons.
First, lawyers representing injured consumers in lawsuits against drug
manufacturers help consumers recover money for their injury and the pain and
suffering they have experienced. These lawsuits help to hold drug manufacturers
accountable for the harm they have caused. In addition, such lawsuits provide
economic incentives for drug manufacturers to carefully disclose the risks of the
medications they manufacture.
Second, these advertisements help inform the public about important drug
safety information. Lawyers who purchase these advertisements typically base the
content of their advertisements on announcements or warnings issued by the Food
& Drug Administration (FDA) or based upon very large scientific studies.
Therefore, these advertisements help patients by making them aware of the risks
associated with certain medications.
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Control condition instructions:
In a moment, you will watch an advertisement that was run during an episode
of "Dancing with the Stars." The show pairs a number of well known celebrities
with professional ballroom dancers, who each week compete by performing one
or more choreographed routines that follow the prearranged theme for that
particular week.
The dancers are then scored by a panel of judges. Viewers are given a certain
amount of time to place votes for their favorite dancers, either by telephone or (in
some countries) online. The couple with the lowest combined score provided by
the judges and viewers is eliminated. This process continues until there are only
two or three couples left; when they have competed for the last time one couple is
declared the champion.
Versions have also been produced in dozens of countries across the world. As
a result, the series became the world's most popular television program among all
genres in 2006 and 2007, according to the magazine Television Business
International, reaching the Top 10 in 17 countries.
18:2 (2019)
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APPENDIX B: DRUG INJURY ADVERTISEMENTS
Transparent Advertisement
Male "If you have taken
Announcer the drug Reglan
this message is for
you.,'
Female "If you or a family







Ken Nugent I'm attorney Ken
Nugent if you or a
loved one has taken
this drug and were
injured call us right
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Deceptive Advertisement
Female "Caution! Have you












grimacing orNprotrusion of the !
tongue." 1





have a claim to
compensation."
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